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THE FAULT WITH "NO-FAULT"
Leonard M. Ring*
I. Introduction
Having to date testified in the legislative councils of almost half the states in
the union on "no-fault" automobile insurance, it is manifestly clear to this author
at least, that most legislators pondering the matter are handicapped by a material
lack of factual data concerning the subject upon which they are called to legislate.
And while most people, including members of the news media, have taken a posi-
tion on no-fault, few understand it.
A. No-Fault Auto Insurance
No-fault automobile insurance is in reality a new name for an old product.
It is simply a very limited form of accident insurance, or more precisely, insurance
against medical and wage loss resulting from accident by automobile. There is
nothing new or innovative about such coverage. The Travelers Insurance Com-
pany was formed in 1863, over 110 years ago, to sell medical and wage loss pro-
tection to travelers on steamships and railways. The newly formed company
called its insurance package "travelers" insurance-from which the company
derived its name.' Such "travelers" insurance has been available to automobile
owners on an optional basis for over a quarter of a century as "medical pay" and
"automobile income disability" coverage. Another "travelers" or no-fault type
of coverage, "automobile collision insurance," has been as familiar to motorists
as the horn on their automobile for almost three-quarters of a century. Today
it is promoted as no-fault insurance, a term which connotes different ideas
to different people-with resulting unfortunate confusion.
The essential difference between the "travelers" insurance for steamship and
railway passengers of 1863 and the automobile no-fault insurance of 1974 is
that for the automobile passenger it would be compulsory"-requiring every
motorist to insure himself, members of his household and occupants of his
vehicle against medical and wage loss sustained by accident from automobile
(as one California journalist so aptly stated, "to insure himself against what some-
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one else may do to him") ,' a principle which most Americans find hard to swallow
as evidenced by the stiff resistance to the enactment of such laws during the past
four or five years. But the main opposition is aimed not so much against the
compulsory aspect of such coverage as it is against the proponents' attempts to
abrogate, in whole or in good measure, the innocent victim's right to recover
general damages under the tort system. For example, under a total no-fault
system as advocated by the American Insurance Association (AIA), regardless
of how seriously injured or how gruesome his disfigurement, the extent of his
disability, or the excruciating nature of his lifelong pain, the automobile accident
victim would be eligible for reimbursement of only his necessary medical expense.
Those employed at the time of the injury (about 35 per cent of the victims)
would recover some, but seldom all of their wage loss. Responsibility of the
wrongdoer would be totally abolished-as would be, of course, the fundamental
rights of the victim. Even the less extreme plans sponsored by other trade
associations such as the American Mutual Insurance Association (AMIA) and
the National Association of Independent Insurers (NAIl) would sharply curtail
the right to receive compensation for pain and suffering, impaired earning
capacity, temporary disability, and sometimes even permanent disability of more
than 90 per cent of the victims. Stated differently, the principal backers of "no-
fault," which include many of the eastern stock insurance companies, are not
only lobbying for a system that would require every motorist to purchase their
"travelers" insurance, but to force the purchase of such insurance by the would-
be victim as a substitute for his rights to full damages from the wrongdoer under
the tort liability system.
The Delaware Plan which retains the right of a victim to sue for general
damages while providing for no-fault payment of medical expenses is a more
acceptable system that is considered in the conclusion.
II. Insurance Systems in Force Today
A. Automobile Insurance Systems
We presently operate under a dual automobile insurance system: "no-
fault" and liability (fault). The standard automobile insurance policy in force
today offers the motorist varieties of "no-fault" coverage. Medical pay (in
multiples of $500) is offered to cover the medical expense of the driver and every
passenger injured in the automobile. About 70 per cent to 80 per cent of in-
sured private passenger cars on the road today carry about $2,000 or more med-
ical pay coverage. This coverage is on a no-fault basis. That is, it makes no
difference how or why the person was injured, whether it be in a two-car col-
lision or in a single-car accident with a lamp post or a tree. Nor does it matter
2 An editorialist also had thus anticipated a supporter's disillusionment:
The theory of No Fault is to save some of the millions in legal costs and pass it back
in reduced premiums, also giving the courts some welcome relief and additional savings
to the taxpayer. A fine theory, but something is getting lost in the translation into
law, and the first thing lost is the money that was going to be saved.... The result
is a right idea gone wrong, a whole concept being half baked.
The Ventura Star Free Press, May 25, 1972.
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if the injured victim was the driver or an innocent passenger in the vehicle. Wage
continuation benefits are also offered by many major automobile insurers to
their policyholders. Thus, a person may generally purchase the amount of pro-
tection he needs, depending, of course, on his level of earnings and the other ac-
cident insurance he has in force. Accidental death benefits are offered by many
automobile insurers, as are funeral expenses in the amount of $500 or $1,000.
Collision insurance, the most common no-fault coverage, pays the motorist
for damage to his motor vehicle whether caused through his own carelessness or the
fault of others; generally, it is sold with a $50 or $100 deductible. As previously
noted, all the above coverages are on a no-fault basis. Recovery by the victim
or his survivors is from his own insurer, and payment is due promptly, upon pre-
sentment and verification of loss, just as it would be under the well-publicized
"no-fault" plans.
Coverage for bodily injury and property damage (B.I./P.D.) comprises
the other half of the dual automobile insurance system. This coverage protects
the motorist against claims for bodily injury or property damage he may
negligently inflict on others. The bodily injury portion provides indemnity to
the motorist for any loss that he may incur by reason of injury or death to any
human being. The property damage portion provides the same type of protection
to the motorist for physical damage he may cause, e.g., damage to someone else's
vehicle, a lamp post, or other property. As a practical matter, it is this coverage,
the B.I./P.D., that the injured automobile accident victim looks to for payment
of his damages in a tort action, i.e., when he makes a claim or brings suit against
the party responsible for his loss.
B. Health Insurance Coverage Other Than Auto
An analysis of the public need for no-fault auto insurance requires some in-
sight into the health insurance plans currently available to the automobile ac-
cident victim. By the end of 1971, 180 million Americans were protected by one
or more forms of private health insurance. As to persons under age 65, 9 out of
10 had some form of private health insurance. And, despite the Medicare
program, 11 million persons, or 5 out of 9 of the estimated 21 million persons
age 65 and over, still hold private health insurance policies to supplement benefits
received under the Medicare program.8 These plans fall into four general cate-
gories: hospital expense, surgical expense, regular medical expense, and major
medical expense coverage.
C. Hospital Expense Insurance
These plans provide benefits toward the expense of hospital room and board,
x-ray, and other diagnostic charges. At the end of 1971, 180 million people were
protected by hospital expense insurance. From 1961 to 1971, the number of
people protected by such plans increased by 34 per cent. In 1971, insurance
3 HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE, 1972-73 SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE 17
[hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK].
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companies protected nearly 113 million people, or 63 per cent of the total number
of persons with hospital expense insurance, while Blue Cross, Blue Shield and
medical society-approved plans protected 78 million, or 43 per cent of the total
insured. Other plans covered 9 million, or 5 per cent. The number of persons
covered exceeds 100 per cent due to some persons having coverage through more
than one type of insuring organization.'
D. Surgical Expense Insurance
The second most popular form of health insurance is surgical expense cover-
age. By the end of 1971, 92 per cent of the persons insured against hospital
expense were protected against surgical expense. This insurance provides for
payment of the surgeons' fees for each surgical procedure, usually with pre-
scribed limits. The number of persons having surgical expense insurance reached
more than 165 million by the end of 1971, a 35 per cent growth over the decade.
The most dramatic rise in such coverage occurred in the fifteen years preceding
1961. 5
Insurance companies protected 102 million persons, or 62 per cent, while
Blue Cross, Blue Shield organizations and medical society-approved plans pro-
tected 69 million, or 42 per cent of the total. More than 11 million persons, or
7 per cent were insured through other plans.0 As is obvious from the aggregate
percentage (111 per cent), some people were protected under more than one
policy.
E. Regular Medical Expense Insurance
Over 144 million persons were protected against regular medical expenses
by the close of 1971. Regular medical expense insurance provides benefits
toward physicians' fees for non-surgical care rendered in the hospital, at home,
or at the doctor's office. Some regular medical expense plans also provide benefits
for diagnostic, x-ray, and laboratory expense. From 1961 to 1971 the number of
persons insured by private carriers for regular medical expense increased by 82
per cent.! All in all, more than 144 million Americans were protected for such
expense through insurance companies, Blue Cross, Blue Shield and other plans.
F. Major Medical Expense Insurance
Major medical expense insurance coverage is also becoming ever more pop-
ular. In twenty years the number of insured has grown to 81 million. Benefits
under this form of coverage are virtually unlimited and usually cover the policy-
holder for high dollar amounts. These policies help cover the cost of treatment
4 Id. at 17. The number of persons covered exceeds 100% due to some persons having
coverage through more than one type of insuring organization.
5 Id. at 20.
6 Id. at 20.
7 Id. at 22.
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given in and out of the hospital, special nursing care, x-rays, prescriptions, med-
ical appliances, nursing home care, ambulatory psychiatric care, and many other
health care needs.
The total number of persons covered under all the various plans outlined
abbve is recapitulated for convenience as follows: 8
NUMBER OF PERSONS WITH HEALTH INSURANCE PROTECTION
BY TYPE OF COVERAGE
In the United States
(000 omitted)
Regular Major Disability income
End of Hospital Surgical medical medical Short- Long-
year expense* expense* expense* expense termf term
1961 134,417 122,951 93,466 34,138 43,055 .
1962 139,176 126,900 97,404 38,250 44,902
1963 144,575 131,954 102,302 42,441 44,475 3,029
1964 148,338 135,433 107,686 47,001 45,270 3,420
1965 151,483 139,437 110,922 51,946 49,690 4,457
1966 155,864 143,284 115,453 56,742 50,003 5,002
1967 160,649 148,729 121,522 62,226 51,915 6,632
1968 167,209 153,977 127,994 66,861 55,677 7,718
1969 170,855 158,584 133,686 72,292 57,627 9,076
1970:
Under 65 164,210 153,352 132,349 76,164 57,833 10,740
65 and over 11,172 9,303 8,368 2,053 - -
Total 175,382 162,655 140,717 78,217 57,833 10,740
1971:
Under 65 168,513 155,841 135,970 78,516 58,850 12,011
65 and over 11,387 9,608 8,472 2,158 - -
Total 179,900 165,449 144,442 80,674 58,850 12,011
G. Medicare, Public Welfare and Medicaid
The foregoing computations do not take into account the 10 million Amer-
icans who qualify for Medicare but are not protected by supplemental private
insurance programs." Additionally, millions of people in the United States are
recipients of medical care through their state, county and municipal public wel-
fare departments. Still others are currently recipients of Medic-aid, a federally
supported health care program for the poor.
8 Id. at 18.
9 Id. at 11. Medicare is the hospital insurance system and the supplementary medical
insurance for the aged created by the 1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act and operated
under the provisions of the Act.
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H. Automobile Medical Pay
As previously mentioned, 70 to 80 per cent of automobile insurance policy-
holders carry medical pay coverage. Most such coverage is in the amount of
$2,000, enough to pay the full medical expense of more than 98 per cent of the
automobile accident victims. For most people this duplicates coverage they
already have under a health insurance plan.
I. National Health Insurance
If all the above insurance programs are not enough, Congress has for years
been debating enactment of a National Health Insurance program. This would
provide medical coverage to every man, woman, and child in the United States.
Even if such a plan is not enacted, it seems reasonably certain, judging from the
rapid growth of prepaid medical plans, that within the next decade practically
no one will be without substantial or total medical coverage.
J. Loss of Income Protection-Other Than Auto
The number of persons protected by wage continuation plans in case of
accident or illness is also surprisingly high. These plans are designed to provide
wage earners with regular weekly or monthly payments in the event their wages
are cut off because of disability due to illness or injury. This coverage takes the
form of short-term or long-term protection. Short-term policies extend benefits
for a maximum period of two years; long-term plans contain benefit periods
longer than two years. At the end of 1971, the total national work force was
approximately 81 million persons, 71 million of whom were covered by loss of in-
come protection.1" Of these 71 million, 12 million were covered by long-term
disability policies written by insurance companies. This number increased by 12
per cent during 1971, while the increase in short-term plans for that year was
2 per cent. Many persons covered by long-term disability policies also had short-
term coverage.
K. Income Disability Protection By Auto Insurers
Automobile insurers have been writing income disability coverage (wage
loss) for at least 30 years." Through 1971, however, only 1 per cent to 2 per
cent of automobile policyholders purchased such coverage. While nationwide
statistics are currently unavailable for 1972, it is reasonably certain that that
figure has grown immensely as a result of the no-fault debates, particularly since
the coverage is now being widely offered throughout the nation by major auto-
mobile insurers. In the past, there was a total lack of awareness by motorists that
such coverage was even available.
10 Id. at 25.
11 Record at 311-12, Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N. E.2d 474 (1972). For the
cost of automobile disability coverage, see Record, at 287.
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The cost of combination medical and wage loss coverage limited to loss re-
sulting from auto accident is exceedingly low. Continental Insurance Company
began offering such coverage in 1971 for four to five dollars a vehicle. Concord
General Mutual Insurance Company provides $750 per month income loss
indemnity for $7 a year, provided medical pay coverage is purchased by the
motorist at regular rate. State Automobile Casualty Underwriter of Nebraska
provides a combination-package of $10,000 coverage for both medical and wage
loss for only $10 a year to persons above age 65 and $8 to persons under 65.
Wage loss under the plan is limited to $750 per month. One of the reasons why
such coverage is so inexpensive is that the economic loss of the vast majority of
automobile accident victims is relatively small. According to a Department of
Transportation (DOT) Study completed in 1970, the total economic loss to the
date of settlement suffered by automobile accident victims is as follows:' 2
Percentage Cumulative
Total Economic Loss of Claimants Percentage
$0-499 78.9% 78.9%
$500-999 10.2% 89.1%
$1,000 - 1,499 4.0% 93.1%
$1,500 - 2,499 3.2% 96.3 %
$2,500- 4,999 2.2% 98.5%
$5,000 - 9,999 1.1 % 99.6%
$10,000- 24,999 .3% 99.9%
$25,000 + .1% 100.0%
Another reason why the cost of such coverage is low is that only about one-
third of all auto accident victims sustain wage loss.
It is evident from the foregoing analysis of the vast numbers of people cur-
rently insured for medical and wage loss coverage that there is no critical need
for compulsory no-fault legislation. The real objective of the proponents of
automobile no-fault insurance is to curb or abolish the tort liability system.
If they succeed, the automobile casualty writers will gain a captive market not
only for medical and wage loss coverage, which they have found to be very
lucrative, but also for compulsory bodily injury coverage, yet the carriers will be
exposed to liability for general damages in only about two or three per cent of
the automobile accident cases. On top of all that, the few victims who would
succeed in a tort recovery will have to reimburse their own insurance com-
panies for the medical and wage loss they had previously received, notwithstand-
ing the fact that they paid a premium for that coverage. To be sure, under no-
fault the automobile insurance industry would clearly benefit.
12 DEPT. oF TRANSPORTATION [hereinafter DOT], PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS (1970).
Total loss in medical expense, wages, and replacement services is at time of settlement. 1970.
13 The $500 medical threshold is presently in force in Massachusetts, Kansas, and Utah.
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III. Thresholds
The method most commonly advocated by the promoters of no-fault schemes
for the abrogation of tort recovery by the victim is that of the medical-threshold.
This approach bars the accident victim from asserting a claim for pain, suffering,
mental anguish, temporary and sometimes even permanent disability, unless his
reasonable medical expenses exceed a certain monetary amount. The most com-
mon medical threshold is $500.13 At least two states have thresholds in lesser
amounts.1 4 One state has $750 threshold;15 one has a threshold of $1,0001
(The latter was the amount settled on by the nine signatories to the 1972
"Camel-Back Accord" of the casualty insurance underwriters.") To appreciate
the impact of such limitations on the right of recovery of the innocent auto-
mobile accident victim, the following DOT statistics relating to medical treatment
expenses must be taken into account: 18
Total Medical and Excluded from
Hospital Costs Tort Remedy
$ 500-$ 999 92.4%
$1,000 -$2,499 96.7%
$2,500 - $4,999 98.1%
In excess of $5,000 99.4%
It is apparent from the foregoing table that more than 92 per cent of auto-
mobile accident victims would fail to reach a medical threshold of even $500.
Almost 98 per cent of the victims would be barred from recovery by a $1,000
threshold. A counterargument frequently encountered is that medical costs have
risen since 1970 when the DOT completed its study. This may be true as to
hospital costs. But very few automobile accident victims (not much more than
10 per cent) spend a significant amount of time in a hospital. For example, many
non-complicated fracture victims are in a hospital for only a few days--just long
enough to make sure that their cast is not on so tightly that circulation is im-
paired, or that the fragments are properly aligned. Others, with more simple
fractures, may leave the hospital after a cast has been applied in the emergency
room. In either example, the medical bills may be well under $500 and certainly




17 The nine participating companies were Allstate, State Farm, Kemper, INA, Nation-
wide, Hartford, Fireman's Fund, Liberty Mutual. and Travelers. The document takes its
name from the posh Camelback Inn in Phoenix, Arizona, where the nine auto insurance giants
met on December 8 and 9, 1972, to establish a "unified industry" position on no-fault. Almost
immediately thereafter, the "model industry bill" began to appear in state legislatures around
the country as the bible for auto insurance "reform."
18 DOT, AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMs, supra note 12. Total loss in medical
expense, wages, and replacement services is at time of settlement.
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below $1,000, yet the victim may endure months or years of suffering, and lose
weeks or months from school or work. 9
A. Verbal Thresholds
Other forms of thresholds popular with the insurance industry are verbal
thresholds. These restrict the right to maintain a tort action to victims sustaining
certain types of injuries or permanent disability. Injuries resulting in death, dis-
figurement, dismemberment, and permanent total or permanent partial disability,
were in recent years deemed to be sufficiently "serious" to warrant compensation
for pain, suffering and disability." According to the testimony of an insurance
actuary in the Illinois no-fault case of Grace v. Howlett, under that combination
of verbal thresholds only 5.4 per cent of automobile accident victims would
qualify
2 1
The "Camel-Back Accord" placed an even more restrictive obstacle to the
right of recovery for the automobile accident victim. To be deemed "serious"
under that agreement, the victim's injury must result in death, dismemberment,
significant permanent disability (which was left undefined), or serious disfigure-
ment. Some variations would require that the disfigurement mar the person's
appearance and be irreparable. Less than 3 per cent of fatal and non-fatal
automobile accident victims would be able to recover for intangible or "non-
economic" loss under these standards.
B. Time Thresholds
Still another approach for abolishing the victim's tort rights is the "time"
or "disability" threshold. Under this qualification, the victim must be con-
tinuously and totally disabled for a given period of time. Generally, the "time"
threshold is used in combination with other forms of thresholds, and may be for
any arbitrary period of time. No state as of yet has passed a time threshold bill,
but the one most often encountered in legislative bills is either the thirty- or
sixty-day threshold. In other words, the victim would have to establish total dis-
ability for thirty or sixty consecutive days in order to be eligible for tort recovery.
The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA) goes
further. UMVARA requires total inability to engage in normal activities for
more than six months. To grasp the impact of such thresholds on the potential
victim, consider the following DOT findings:22
19 Further offsetting such arguments is the fact that the frequency and severity of injury are
steadily decreasing due to better highways and safer cars. This is perhaps the reason that the
foregoing statistics were still used by insurance industry officials in their testimony before the
Senate Commerce Committee on February 6 and 7, 1973.
20 There were four criteria postulated for the classification of an injury as "serious" in
one DOT study. They were hospitalization for two weeks or more, or $500 or more of
medical costs excluding hospital cost, or, if working, three weeks or more of missed work, or
if not working, six weeks or more of missed normal activities. DOT, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
oF AUTOmoBiLE AcCIDENT INJURIES (1970).
21 Record, Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 '(1972). Testimony of
Charles Hewitt, Actuary for Allstate Insurance Company.
22 DOT, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES oF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INSURANCE, supra note 20.
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Period of Disability Percentage of Claimants
Less than 1 day 18.6%
One day up to a week 30.6%
More than 1 week-up to 2 weeks 14.9%
More than 2 weeks-up to 3 weeks 9.3 %
More than 3 weeks-up to 4 weeks 5.1%
More than 4 weeks-up to 5 weeks 3.6%
More than 5 weeks--up to 6 weeks 3.5%
More than 6 weeks-up to 7 weeks 1.6%
More than 7 weeks---up to 8 weeks 1.7%
More than 8 weeks 11.1%
100.00%
These figures reached by the DOT were not on a basis of consecutive total dis-
ability, but rather the total number of days that the victim was disabled prior to
settlement. Far fewer victims could establish a claim under the "total continuous
disability" standard. Presumably, disability to any degree was insufficient.
A six-month "time" threshold proposed by UMVARA would be reached
only by paraplegics, quadriplegics, severe brain damage victims and a few
victims suffering other catastrophic injury. According to the DOT study about
.2 of 1 per cent of non-fatal auto accident victims would qualify.23
C. The Medical Formula Plan
Another form of threshold, one even more subtle than the others, is the
"formula" plan concocted by the National Association of Independent Insurers
and dubbed by them as the "Dual Protection Plan." Under this plan, which
was in fact enacted and then held unconstitutional in Illinois,2 the victim is
limited in his recovery of general damages to a portion of his medical treatment
expenses. The Illinois Plan provided that except in injuries resulting in death,
dismemberment, disfigurement and total or permanent partial disability, the
victim's maximum recovery for general damages was limited to 50 per cent of
all medical expense under $500, and to a dollar for every dollar medical expense
in excess of $500. The evidence in Grace v. Howlett revealed that the right of
23 One DOT study estimated that only 4 per cent of all paid claimants sustained any
permanent partial disability, and about 0.2 per cent suffered permanent total disability. DOT,
For the memorandum PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS, supra note 12.
24 Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
25 Much has been made of the fact that the right to maintain a traditional tort action for
general damages has been preserved in Illinois by Article XXXV. According to the defendants'
own exhibits, however, this is a complete farce. Record, Defendants' Exhibits 4 & 5, Grace v.
Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). These exhibits, prepared from a study made
by Allstate for the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), show that 94.6 per cent of all
bodily injury claims arising out of automobile accidents would fall within Section 608. Record,
Defendants' Exhibit 4, Id. This was confirmed by Mr. Hewitt, who conducted and supervised
the study. Record at 294, Id. Even more shocking was the disclosure that, by application of the
formula provided under Section 608, the following consequences would result:
(a) About 50% of the 94.6% (47.3% of all accident victims) would be limited
in their recovery to a sum ranging from $.50 to $50. This wouldn't even cover the
cost of the filing fee.
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recovery of 94.6 per cent of all automobile accident victims would be governed by
the formula. Of this number, about 90 per cent would have been limited to a
maximum recovery of $250. The Dual Protection Plan indeed provided "dual"
protection-but to the industry, not the victim. For the victim the right to gen-
eral damages was nothing more than an illusion. No one could afford to retain a
lawyer to prosecute so minimal a claim, and even if one as a matter of principle
were willing to bear the costs, he would still have to prove his case under the
tort system.
D. The Inequity of Thresholds
Thresholds, whether medical, verbal, or time, would adversely affect almost
every potential automobile accident victim, but their impact would be severe on
the honest claimant, particularly if poor. The unscrupulous victim could make
endless visits to his physician or be admitted to a hospital in order to reach the
requisite monetary or time threshold for a tort claim. The highly principled
victim on the other hand, may return to part-time employment, may medicate
at home with heat pads, heat lamps, or other home diathermy. In return for such
conduct, the housewife who performed her chores in constant pain would be
barred from tort recovery for her disability and suffering. The same inequity
would be heaped upon the conscientious workman who returned to duty after
only a few days stay in the hospital with his arm in a cast. Paradoxical as the
foregoing hypothetical examples may be, thresholds would have their greatest im-
pact on the poor. Excerpts from a Model Cities Study26 introduced into evidence
in the Grace v. Howlett case revealed that heads of households of approximately
66 per cent of the families residing within the target area were unemployed
females. Another 16 per cent of household heads were unemployed males. The
average income of 24 per cent of the households was below $2,500 a year.
Fully 58 per cent had incomes under $5,000. Many of these families receive
medical care through federally supported Medicaid programs or through county
welfare, or both. These households and others like them would, through
"beneficent" no-fault plans, be compelled to expend as much as 10 to 20
per cent of their meager incomes for medical insurance, which they now get free,
(b) Another 40% of the 94.6% '(37.8% of all auto accident victims) would
be limited to a claim that would range from $50 to $150.
(c) An additional 5% of the 94.6% (4.7% of all auto accident victims) would
be limited in their recovery to a sum ranging from $150 to $250.
Record, supra, at 298. Thus, about 90 per cent of all automobile accident victims could re-
cover less than $250 through a tort action-if, and only if, they could prove under traditional
tort rules.
26 Heads of households who are unemployed are likely to be able to pay for health care
whether at the time of service or on a pre-payment basis. Results for the areas follow:
% Female Household
% Male Household Head Not Working
Head Unemployed -Not Retired Total %
Total Target Areas 11 66 37
Grand Boulevard 10 65 41
Lawndale 7 75 35
Uptown 12 51 28
Woodlawn 15 71 41
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and wage loss, which they do not have. Worse still, in order to purchase such
coverage, these individuals, like all others, will have to purchase liability and
property damage coverage, but should they be injured in an automobile ac-
cident, 97 to 98 per cent of them would be barred by subtle "threshold" pro-
visions from recovery of any damages.
This would hold true for the aged and retired. Their medical is covered
by Medicare and they have no wage loss. It likewise holds true for the housewife,
the student, the pre-school child, the disabled person, and retired veteran.
None of them would have wage loss, and almost all of them have Blue Cross/
Blue Shield or other prepaid health programs for the payment of their medical
expense.
Even self-employed persons may fail to qualify for wage or income loss. A
salesman, lawyer or business executive, for example, may carry on all or a sub-
stantial part of his business or professional functions from his home or even a
hospital bed. What would be his wage loss? All these people nevertheless may
be barred from maintaining a tort action by force of a medical or time threshold.
In sum, since no more than 35 per cent of the automobile accident victims incur
wage loss, it follows that 65 per cent would receive nothing more than the pay-
ment of their medical expense. Some might not even recover all of their medical
expense where the first party (no-fault) benefits are inadequate.
Moreover, of the small percentage of the public that may recover some wage
loss, thresholds may affect their chance of full wage loss recovery. Most no-fault
laws provide for a maximum wage benefit of $200 a week2  Some provide less.2
Thus, if a workman earns $300 a week (not uncommon today) and is off three
weeks from work, under a $200 a week no-fault plan he would still lose $300. If
he is barred from maintaining a tort action for general damages by reason of a
threshold, how could he recover the difference between his wage loss and the
amount of indemnity paid him by his own automobile insurance carrier? No
lawyer, no matter how much a neophyte, could afford to take such a small case.




To date, only two reported cases have challenged the constitutionality of a
no-fault statute. In Pinnick v. Cleary,29 the Massachusetts law was upheld. The
Illinois Act, on the other hand, was held unconstitutional in Grace v. Howlett50
The Illinois statute provided $2,000 medical and $150 weekly wage loss in-
27 Minnesota, Virginia, Connecticut, New Jersey, Utah and Kansas.
28 New York and Florida.
29 271 N. E. 2d 592 (Mass. 1971).
30 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). The reader should also note that the Florida
and Kansas lower courts have recently held their state No-Fault laws curtailing recovery for
personal injury unconstitutional. See Edwards v. Thompson and United Services Automobile
Assoc., Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Duval County, Florida, Gen. No. 73-3551 CA




demnity for 52 weeks to the injured victim.8 1 This was on a first party or no-
fault basis. The plan also provided that where the victim sustained injury
resulting in death, disfigurement, dismemberment or permanent total or per-
manent partial disability, the victim's recovery for general damages was limited
to 50 per cent of the first $500 of medical expense and 100 per cent of the
medical expense incurred in excess of $500. The plaintiff, Michael Grace, insti-
tuted a taxpayer's suit in which he charged, inter alia, that the statute was in-
valid because it discriminated against the poor and against people in rural areas.
To support his charge of discrimination the plaintiff produced evidence of
a wide disparity in hospital and medical costs throughout the state. This evidence
revealed that the cost of a semi-private hospital room in Illinois ranged from $13
to $115 a day. A survey of the American Hospital Association introduced into
evidence showed that the costs of x-rays, clinical, laboratory, medicine and other
ancillary hospital expenses also varied widely throughout the state, and almost
always were found to be lower in rural areas than in metropolitan centers.
Medical costs in the City of Chicago also vary widely. They ranged from $3 to
more than $20 per visit, a difference of more than 600 per cent. And in-
disputably, the costs of medical care were less for the poor than the affluent. For
example, medical costs for the treatment of a simple fracture of the ulna, which
would generally entail only the application of a short cast, were shown to be
approximately $25 to $35 in low income areas of Chicago, whereas the cost for
the same treatment was $75 to $100 on Michigan Avenue, one of the more
affluent office centers in the City. A similar disparity existed between other
medical charges in rural areas and large cities. The plaintiff successfully main-
tained that, in light of the wide disparity in the cost of medical care in Illinois,
the statute was arbitrary and discriminatory, particularly in its application to the
poor. In his memorandum opinion, the trial judge called it "discrimination of
the rankest kind, impossible for this Court to rationalize, justify or sustain." 2 As
he further found:
... the discriminatory and arbitrary classifications inherent in the state
"no-fault" insurance statute abound and multiply, yet none of them can
be found to bear any reasonable relationship to the intended purposes of
the act."3
The case was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, which found that the
statute's application to only private passenger automobiles, to the exclusion of
other motor vehicles, constituted special legislation in violation of a provision of
the Illinois Constitution which prohibited the passage of special laws where a
One additional reported case pertaining to property damage only is Kluger v. White, 281
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). In Kluger, the Florida Supreme Court held the $550 property damage
exemption unconstitutional since it failed to comply with constitutional provisions that courts
shall remain open to every person for redress of any injury.
31 Public Act 77-1430 became effective January 1, 1972 and the Illinois General Assembly
added Article XXXV to the Illinois Insurance Code. ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065,150-
1065,163 (1971). Article XXXV was entitled "Compensation of Automobile Accident Victims."
32 Grace v. Howlett, 71 Ch. 4737. at 3.
33 Id.
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general law is or could be made applicable. Accordingly, the court held it un-
necessary to review the equal protection issue decided by the trial court (state
high courts generally do not decide federal constitutional questions where local
constitutional grounds exist for a complete determination of the controversy). It
would also appear that, in view of the social implications involved, the Illinois
Supreme Court felt that every state should decide for itself whether such a
statute would deprive its citizens of equal protection of the laws.
Pinnick v. Cleary,34 on the other hand, held the Massachusetts no-fault law
constitutional. The Massachusetts court, however, did not decide whether the
$500 medical threshold discriminated against the poor. On the contrary, it re-
fused to rule on that contention on the ground that the plaintiff failed to intro-
duce any evidence to support his discrimination allegation. 5 Grace and Pinnick
may be reconciled by the fact that in Grace the plaintiff did introduce evidence
to support the charge of discrimination.
B. Constitutional Validity of Medical Thresholds
It seems fair to speculate that, if the Illinois Act in fact denied its citizens
equal protection of the laws and invidiously discriminated against the poor,
then any form of medical threshold denies equal protection. Under the Illinois
Act, the victim's maximum recovery was limited to a percentage of his reasonable
medical expense. If his medical expense was less, by reason of the geographical
area where he resided or by reason of his poverty, then his maximum recovery
was less. If his costs were higher he could recover more.
Under a medical threshold, on the other hand, the injured victim recovers
nothing unless his medical expenses exceed the threshold. It would seem that, if
it is held that giving the victim with the lower medical bills less is unconstitution-
al, then giving him nothing should be unconstitutional. Clearly, therefore,
through the proper introduction of evidence establishing the disparity in medical
expense between the rich and poor or between rural and urban areas, acts based
on medical threshold might be successfully challenged. The amount of recovery,
to be sure, is in no way related to the nature of the injury, but to the wealth or
poverty of the victim, or his place of residence or treatment.
The Governor of New Mexico vetoed a no-fault law patterned after the
Illinois Act, in relying in part upon his Attorney General's opinion that the act
was unconstitutional. 6 On the other hand the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire, in an advisory opinion, declared that a $500 or $1000 medical threshold,
if enacted, would be valid. The 3 to 2 opinion, however, made no reference to
Grace v. Howlett, nor did it address itself to the issue of discrimination against
the poor. Regrettably, the opinion appears to have reached more of an accom-
modation than a judicial determination of the significant constitutional issues
raised.
3 7
34 271 N.E.2d 592 '(Mass. 1971).
35 Id. at 609-11.
36 Opinion of David L. Norvell, Att'y Gen. of New Mexico, March 28, 1973.




V. The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act
A. Essence
The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparation Act, (UMVARA),
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
contains more stringent restrictions on tort recovery than any act previously recom-
mended for adoption by a state legislature." Thus far it has not been favorably
received in any state, although the Michigan law closely resembles it. In essence,
UNVARA provides:
1. First Party Benefits: Payment of all reasonable medical and
rehabilitative expenses without limit.
2. Reimbursement up to an aggregate of $200 per week for lost
earnings. However, benefits received from Social Security, Workmen's
Compensation, and state-required non-occupational disability insurance
would be subtracted. So would a sum not to exceed 15 per cent for
income tax savings.
3. The act also provides reimbursement for the reasonable expense
for replacement services. This benefit is subject to a one-week waiting
period. 9
In fatal cases, a sum not to exceed $200 a week is made available to those sur-
vivors entitled to recover damages for economic loss under the Wrongful Death
Act of the particular state."0 A $500 funeral benefit is also recoverable in case
of death.4 These benefits are subject to the same subtractibles as wage loss.
Wage loss recovery in excess of $200 is permissible, but only where the victim
dies or is disabled for more than six months. In the non-fatal cases, there is no
provision for recovery of the difference between the $200 weekly benefit and
38 The UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONs ACT [hereinafter cited
UMVARA] was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and approved and recommended by it for enactment in all the states at its Annual Conference
Meeting at San Francisco, California, August 4-11, 1972.
39 Under UMVARA, "replacement services loss" means expenses reasonably incurred in
obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those the injured person would have
performed, not for income but for the benefit of himself or his family, if he had not been
injured. The one-week waiting period is governed by Section 12 of UMVARA.
40 UMVARA § 13. Thus, a $200 aggregate limit during any calendar week on the amount
of basic reparation benefits can be recovered for injury to one person as compensation for work
loss, replacement services loss, survivor's economic loss, and survivor's replacement services loss.
Significantly, the $200 limit provided by this section is a limit on benefits to be paid and not
a limit on "loss" or "net loss" which go into the calculation of basic reparation benefits. Thus,
for example, if an injured person's only loss was $225 in wage loss for a one-week period and
was subject to a deduction of $33.75 for income tax advantages in the calculation of net loss,
he would be entitled to recover $191.25. Id. § l1(b). Since the basic reparation benefits pay-
able and attributable to work loss for that one-week period would be less than $200, this
Section would not operate to put a ceiling on his recovery.
41 Id. § 1(a) (5) (i). The funeral benefit includes a total charge not in excess of $500
for expenses in any way related to funeral, cremation, and burial. It does not include that
portion of a charge for a room in a hospital, clinic, convalescent or nursing home, or any other
institution engaged in providing nursing care and related services, in excess of a reasonable
and customary charge for semi-private accommodations, unless intensive care is medically
required.
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any higher sum the victim may have earned during the six-month period.42
Responsibility of the wrongdoer for the difference is abolished.
B. Deductibles
The Act authorizes insurers to offer deductibles of a $100, $300, or
$500 from the total of all benefits payable in any one accident.4 UMVARA
also permits insurers to offer deductibles of $1,000 per accident for all benefits
payable on account of injury to an operator or passenger on a motorcycle." As
noted earlier, most Americans are already insured against a moderate amount
of medical and wage loss. Many plans, however, have a deductible feature that
no-fault auto insurance could complement. But due to the high cost of UM-
VARA, those persons who have gaps in their present coverage would be the ones
most likely to choose the highest deductible under UMVARA. The deductible
feature, therefore, is counter-productive.
C. Tort Liability
The worst feature of UMVARA, however, is the extent to which it restricts
tort liability.4" UMVARA would deny recovery of the first $5,000 in non-
economic damage (i.e., pain and suffering). In no event, however, would any
such damages be recoverable unless the injury results in permanent significant
loss of body function, death, permanent serious disfigurement, or more than six
months of total disability.40 In addition, it would abolish the right to recover the
difference between benefits payable by the motorist's insurer and the actual
earnings of the victim during the first six months of disability. Tort liability for
damage to motor vehicles and the contents therein would also be abolished.
VI. S. 354-The National No-Fault Bill
Payment to Victims
Title II of the National Standards No-Fault Bill, 47 favorably reported by the
Senate Commerce Committee on August 2, 1973, would compel every owner of
a motor vehicle to insure himself for economic loss (i.e., medical and wage loss)
incurred as a result of an automobile accident. The Bill, which is presently
42 Id. § 13. This provides:
Basic reparation benefits payable for work loss, survivor's economic loss, replacement
services loss, and survivor's replacement services loss arising from injury to one person
and attributable to the calendar week during which the accident causing injury occurs
and to each calendar week thereafter may not exceed $200. If the injured person's
earnings or work are seasonable or irregular, the weekly limit shall be equitably
adjusted or apportioned on an annual basis.
43 Id. § 14.
44 Id. § 14 (a) (4).
45 Id. § 5 (a) '(7).
46 Id. "Complete inability of an injured person to work in an occupation" means in-
ability to perform, on even a part-time basis, even some of the duties required by his occupa-
tion for which the injured person was qualified.
47 S. 354, 93d Con., 1st Sess. (1973).
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pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee, provides for payment of the victim's
total medical and rehabilitation expenses.
Wage loss is geared to $1,000 per month," but may be pegged above or
below that figure depending upon the per capita income of the particular state
compared to the national average. In other words, if the state's average per
capita income is two-thirds of the national average, the wage loss benefits for
that state would be two-thirds of $1,000 per month ($666.66). Aggregate wage
loss benefits are set at $25,000, but may be limited by a state to $15,000, if it
found it necessary to do so to keep average premium costs down.49
The following table illustrates the way the formula would have worked in
1971 in the states ranked first and last, in a decimalized fashion.5"
Per Capita Fraction
State Rank Income Per Formula Limit
Conn. 1 $5,032. 1.216 $1,216.
Del. 10 $4,570. 1.114 $1,140.
Wash. 14 $4,135. 1.0 $1,000.
Minn. 20 $3,974. .936 $ 936.
N. H. 30 $3,708. .896 $ 896.
N. Mex. 40 $3,394. .820 $ 820.
Miss. 50 $2,766. .668 $ 668.
It is obvious that each state may enact a different wage loss limitation, and
still comply with the national standard. Presumably, the insurance premium
rate structure for each state would differ depending upon the state maximum.
Moreover, the proposed Act (S. 354) not only limits recovery of wage loss to plus
or minus $1,000, but prohibits recovery of any loss in excess of that sum until
the claimant has exhausted the aggregate wage loss benefits applicable to his
state. 1 If the victim remains disabled beyond six months, social security benefits
to which he would then become entitled would be subtracted from the wage
loss benefits. This would further shrink his monthly auto reparations check
below the one thousand ($1,000) dollar mark.
Victims suffering disability who do not incur wage loss may recover "re-
placement services loss." These are expenses "reasonably incurred in obtaining
ordinary and necessary services in lieu of those the injured person would have
48 Id. § 210 (a) (1).
49 Id. § 210 (a)(2).
50 STATEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA BEFORE THE COM-
MITTEE ON COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 36 (April 11, 1973) [hereinafter cited
as TRIAL LAWYERS' STATEMENT].
The manner in which this formula will work can be illustrated by the 1971 per capita
figures as reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United States, based on data supplied by
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The average per capita income in the United States
in 1971 was said to be $4,138.
The state which came closest to that figure was Washington, with a per capita income of
$4,135. The state of Washington ranked fourteenth among all the states. This means that in
thirteen states, the monthly limitation on wage loss must exceed $1,000; in thirty-six states it
may be less than $1,000; and in the state of Washington the wage loss monthly benefit could
have been exactly $1,000, at least in the year 1971.
51 S. 354, supra note 47, § 210 (a) (2).
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performed."52 An example of "replacement service loss" is the service performed
by a housewife. This benefit is more apparent than real, particularly for the
poor, who will find it difficult to prove necessity for substitute services and more
difficult still to find the money to pay for them. Also, S. 354 benefits would be
reduced by benefits received under social security, except for benefits paid under
Title 19 of the Social Security Act."8 For most aged and retirees, it would mean
they would receive nothing in case of injury by auto-an unwarranted discrimi-
nation against this class of more than 20 million Americans in our enlightened
society.
The aged, disabled, and underprivileged are presently cared for under Title
19 of the Social Security Act.5" That Act provides for medical assistance to
families with dependent children (Medicaid), and medical assistance to the
aged (Medicare), the blind, and the permanently and totally disabled indi-
viduals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the cost of necessary
medical services.55
The very poor would fare no better. Their medical bills are already provided
for under Title 19 of the Social Security Act. Thus, in the event of injury in an
automobile accident, many members of this group would receive only some
medical expense which they would have received free anyway. This would
obtain even though they suffered injuries such as punctured lungs, broken backs
and hips, fractured ribs, fractured arms and legs, and the like-all of which
Washington apparently deems to be "minor" injuries.
B. Tort Recovery Abolished
Under S. 354, the right to tort recovery is virtually abolished. It would sur-
vive only where the accident results in (a) death, (b) serious and permanent
disfigurement or other serious and permanent injury, or (c) more than six
continuous months of total disability. Total disability means "medically deter-
minable physical or mental impairment which prevents the victim from per-
forming all or substantially all of the material acts and duties which constitute
his usual and customary daily activities.""8  According to the DOT studies,5
not more than 4 per cent of all auto accident victims would meet this stringent
threshold."8 The monetary recovery of this small number would be further shrunk
by the provision in the Bill for a mandatory $2,500 deductible from any award
received for "non-economic" detriment.59 Aside from the questions of due process
52 Id. § 101 (21).
53 Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1965).
54 Id.
55 Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. 401 (1965); S.
354, supra note 47, § 209 (b) (Calculation of Loss).
56 S. 354, supra note 47, § 206 (a) (7).
57 DOT, supra note 20.
58 None of the DOT studies gives accurate information as to what proportion of all
victims will retain any tort remedy under S. 354. It is estimated that approximately 1 per cent
of all auto accident victims suffer death. One exception provides that the tort remedy for non-
economic detriment in death cases is not abolished. This preserves a remedy that, for the most
part, doesn't exist. It will have limited application for excess losses and for conscious pain
and suffering preceding death, but these cases will only be a fraction of 1 per cent.
59 S. 354, supra note 47, § 206 (a) (7).
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and other constitutional questions raised by the arbitrary thresholds and the
$2,500 deductible for "pain and suffering," the almost total abolition of the
right to recover general damages is an unjust and immoral encroachment on the
rights of automobile accident victims, two-thirds of whom would be left with
nothing more than the mere payment of medical expenses.
C. Title III - S. 354
If a state should fall to enact a law that meets the federal "standards" at
the first legislative session following enactment of the federal law, Title III of
the federal law would automatically become the law of the state." Title III,
which would remain in force until the state complied, is even more stringent than
Title II. Wage loss and medical expense would be paid without limit, but tort
recovery would be totally abolished, even for the quadriplegics. This is ob-
viously a club to force the states to enact Title II or suffer even worse con-
sequences.
D. Property Damage Claims
In order to recover for property damage to one's vehicle under UMVARA
or S. 354, one must be self-insured. The vehicle owner is given various options:
he may purchase insurance providing collision and comprehensive coverage
which would indemnify him for loss sustained to his vehicle or property inside
the vehicle, or he may purchase "inverse liability coverage."'' The latter would
also pay for the damage to the vehicle and contents and could be obtained at a
lower premium. The catch, however, is that in order to collect under the lower
cost (inverse property damage) coverage, the insured would have to prove that
the damage was caused as a result of the negligence of another person. In other
words, he would have to prove that someone else was at fazdt.
In addition to the two methods of insuring against loss, a person suffering
damage to his vehicle may also recover from the negligent person (or party at
fault) if the damage was caused while the vehicle was parked in an "authorized
area in a public roadway."62 The vast majority of property damage is inflicted
to motor vehicles "in use," not "parked" along the curb on a public roadway.
And although a great number of property damage claims involve rear-end col-
lisions, and it is reasonably simple to establish that some other person is at fault,
there are still those cases involving single car collisions, e.g., where the driver
damages his own vehicle going in and out of the garage, or strikes a lamp post
and the like. Very obviously, therefore, the prudent motorist will be compelled
to buy the more expensive collision and comprehensive coverage. But even with
collision coverage, he will not be able to recover his entire loss since the act
would make $100-deductible mandatory. The right to recover the deductible
is abolished.
60 Id. § 301.
61 Id. § 213 (b) (1) (2).
62 Id. § 213 (c).
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At least under the present tort system a person who owns an older model car
or a second car could very prudently get by with only liability coverage to pro-
tect himself from claims for injury or damage he may cause to others, and remain
self-insured for damage to his own vehicle. If he is a reasonably careful driver,
the chances are very good that in the event of damage to his vehicle he will be
able to recover his entire loss from the party causing it.
Under UMVARA or the federal no-fault plan, the automobile owner will be
forced to purchase his own insurance and will have no recourse against the
wrongdoer at all. This very obviously places an unnecessary burden on the
careful driver in the lower income and even the low middle income group. The
magnitude of the cost to the consumer takes on even greater significance when
one considers that, on the average, about two-thirds of the total premium dollar
is spent for collision and property damage coverage."
VII. Constitutionality of S. 354-Federalism
If a state does not establish a Title II no-fault plan, Title III, the alter-
native state no-fault plan, would go into effect in that state. In that event, a
plethora of affirmative actions would be required of the particular state in the
administration of the federal plan." It is recognized, however, that some states
will not, or constitutionally cannot,65 enact a Title II plan. S. 354, therefore,
employs strong coercive measures to force the states to do so. Clearly the most
63 NAT'L Ass'N. OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS, DUAL PROTECTION 8 (1971). See also,
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE PROPOSED UNIFORM
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT R.PARATIONS ACT, No. 7 (1972).
64 For example, Section 105 requires the State to form and administer an Assigned Risk Plan.
Section 105 (a) (5) requires the plan to give favorable rates to the economically disadvantaged;
Section 105 (a) (6) purports to make a broad grant of powers to the State Insurance Com-
missioner, to adopt rules, make orders, enter into agreements with other governmental and
private entities, etc.
Section 108 provides for the establishment of an Assigned Claims Plan requiring the
creation of a fund in each State which has a no-fault plan under Title II '(State law) or Title
III (Federal law).
Section 108 (b)'(1) authorizes insurers to organize an assigned claims bureau.
If the plan is not organized, then the Insurance Commissioner is empowered and
directed to "organize and maintain an assigned claims bureau and assigned claims
plan." The Act states that "he shall" do so. The assigned claims bureau in the
State, so organized, must follow certain specific requirements of the Federal act
even though the State might wish to solve the problem by other means.
Section 109 (b) requires the State Insurance Commissioner to provide the means to inform
purchasers of insurance about rates, Section 109 (c) compels the Commissioner to "establish
and maintain a program for the regular and periodic evaluation of medical and vocational
rehabilitation services," and Section 109 (d) sets forth guidelines which the Commissioner must
use in implementing that section.
Section 111(d) requires States that do not have a State vocational rehabilitation agency
to create one.
Section 201(d) provides that "the Commissioner in each State shall submit to the Secre-
tary of Transportation, periodically, all relevant information which is requested by the Secre-
tary" so that the Secretary may "evaluate the success of such (no-fault) plan in terms of the
policy" of the Act.
All of the foregoing provisions, and more, would become applicable to a State operating
under a Title III plan (emphasis added).
65 Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Wyoming constitutionally prohibit any
infringement on the right to recover for personal injury. Furthermore, New York constitutionally
forbids any impositions on the right to bring Wrongful Death Actions. See generally, State-




significant coercive measure adopted is with respect to tort liability. Section
206(a) of Title II abolishes all tort actions except for: (1) unsecured vehicles;
(2) persons designing, manufacturing, and servicing vehicles; (3) intentional
injuries; (4-) certain losses stemming from work loss under Section 204(b) (2),
replacement service loss exempted under Section 204(c), and survivor's losses
exempted under Section 204(d); and (5) non-economic detriment in excess of
$2,500 if an accident results in death, serious and permanent disfigurement or
other injury, or more than six continuous months of total disability. By con-
trast, Section 303(a), the comparable provision under the "alternative state
plan" of Title III, permits tort actions only in the first three categories noted
above. It therefore goes considerably further than Section 206(a) in abolishing
tort actions, and imposes a more restrictive law on states whose legislatures do
not enact a no-fault statute comporting to Title II. This disparity, clearly a
punitive measure, underscores the coercive nature of S. 354 and tends to destroy
the claim of the Commerce Committee staff that the bill is but another aspect of
"cooperative federalism." 6
The power of Congress to induce states to enact laws consistent with broad
federal standards by dangling the "carrot" (euphemistically termed "cooperative
federalism"), has long been recognized. Congress, however, cannot compel the
States to enact laws contrary to their own will. The leading case is Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis.6 The act involved in that case provided a federal tax
credit to each taxpayer of up to 90 per cent of what he had contributed to a state
unemployment law, if the state enacted a law which comported to the standards
of the federal act. One state, Alabama, did pass such a law, and a resident
taxpayer of that state challenged the validity of the Act (Title IX of the Social
Security Law), claiming, inter alia, that under the tenth amendment "the tax
and the credit in combination are weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing
the autonomy of the states." The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Cardozo, rejected the argument:
Who then is coerced through the operation of the statute? Not the tax-
payer. He pays in fulfillment of the mandate of the local legislature. Not
the state. Even now she does not offer a suggestion that in passing the unem-
ployment law she was affected by duress... For all that appears she is satis-
fied with her choice, and would be sorely disappointed if it were not to be
annulled.6
66 As Professor Freund has pointed out in THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
23 (1961):
Cooperative federalism has taken many forms, not all of them derived from the
commerce clause. Under the power to tax and spend, Congress may make grants to
the states upon conditions that are relevant to the federal purposes. Congress may
provide a credit for taxpayers against federal taxes on condition that payments are
made by the taxpayer under appropriate conditions to his state .... Modes of co-
operation have been worked out also in the sphere of judicial administration. The
federal district courts regularly hear diversity of citizenship cases instituted there or
removed from a state court, where the cause of action may rest wholly on state law.
Conversely, Congress may require the state courts to entertain causes of action under
federal law....
See also, Testimony of Professor Norman Dorsen Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S.
354, February 7, 1974.
67 301U.S. 548 (1937).
68 Id. at 589.
[April 19741
THE FAULT WITH "NO-FAULT"
The opinion in Steward Machine Co. insistently returns to the vital dlistinc-
tion between "inducement" and "coercion." As a matter of fact, the Court's
conclusion that the law was not coercive, in violation of the tenth amendment,
was influenced in strong measure by the argument presented by Assistant Attor-
ney General, later Mr. Justice, Robert Jackson, that "there is no compulsion
upon the State to adopt any kind of legislation whatever.""9
The exact opposite is true with respect to S. 354. If a state fails to enact
legislation satisfactory to the Secretary of Transportation within a specified time
period, Title III automatically goes into effect, with more severe restrictions
on tort rights and with detailed requirements on state officials. If this is not
"coercion" or "duress," it is difficult to kiiow what these words mean.
No other federal law purports to employ state officials in this way. The
federal laws heretofore enacted either totally pre-empt the field or, come into
play because a state has chosen not to enact legislation in response to a "federal
standards" act. In either case, however, the federal law, when it goes into
effect, is administered and enforced by federal agencies with federal funds.
S. 354, on the other hand, would impose upon states who are unwilling to enact
a Title II law, the duty of administering, and indeed even enacting, legislation
to implement Title III, which undeniably would be a federal law. The net effect
of the statutory scheme thus adopted would be to impair the essence of federalism,
or statehood as it is sometimes called, under our Constitution."
Perhaps one of the more eloquent expressions of the constitutional doctrine
of federalism and its limit, however imprecise, and the power of the Federal
government to control sovereign state action, was stated by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in Polish Alliance v. NLRB:
The interpenetrations of modem society have not wiped out state
lines. It is not for us to make inroads upon our federal system either by in-
difference to its maintenance or excessive regard for the unifying forces of
modem technology. Scholastic reasoning may prove that no activity is
isolated within the boundaries of a single State, but that cannot justify
absorption of legislative power by the United States over every activity.71
Very clearly, S. 354 does not meet this test.
The Senate Commerce Committee in its report on the bill relies on Testa v.
Katt7 for constitutional validity. That case held that state courts were obliged
69 The source of this limitation on the power of Congress is Article IV sec. 4 of the U.S.
Constitution which reads, "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican form of Government," and, to even a greater extent, the Tenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution which provides, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
People."
70 The late Professor Henry M. Hart of the Harvard Law School, in a leading article
entitled The Relations between Federal and State Law, 54 COLUM. L. Rzv. 489, 495 (1954),
stated that. broadly speaking, "federal substantive law operates in relation to State law in two
principal ways." He went on:
As to certain matters, federal law assumes and accepts the basic responsibility of
the states, and seeks simply to regulate the exercise of state authority. As to other
matters, federal law displaces state law, in whole or in part, and in itself takes over,
pro tanto, the basic task of governance of private activity.
71 322 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1944).
72 330 U.S. 387 (1947).
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to enforce claims under federal law, even if penal in nature, if the state court
had "adequate and appropriate [jurisdiction] under established local law to
adjudicate the action." However, the duty of state courts to enforce federal law
where the judicial machinery is in existence and operating, is a far cry from
requiring, as S. 354 does, state administrative agencies to submit to federal au-
thority and administer with state funds, a purely federal law. The former is
expressly granted by the supremacy clause, while the latter is forbidden by the
tenth amendment.
During the hearings on S. 354 by the Senate Judiciary Committee, it was
suggested that S. 354 is analogous to the Glean Air Act.7 That Act authorizes
state officials to promulgate rules to implement the Federal Act, and further
permits the state to administer and enforce such rules if adopted. Upon failure
of the state to promulgate such rules, the Federal Commissioner is thereby au-
thorized to do so. A significant difference, however, between S. 354 and the
Clean Air Act is that, under the latter, it is the Federal Commissioner, not the
state officials, who would administer the federally promulgated rules. Thus, even
if the Clean Air Act should ultimately withstand a constitutional challenge, it
would not serve as precedent for the validity of S. 354.
Even assuming that Congress has the constitutional power to compel the
states to enact a Title II law, the question remains whether it would be wise to
coerce the states to do so or to mandamus them to enact legislation necessary
to implement Title III should it become the law of that State.74 Such an intru-
sion on states' rights, even if constitutionally upheld, would very likely foredoom
the concept of federalism and lead to its complete if not early demise. The
overriding policy question for the Congress is whether S. 354 is worth that price.
VIII. The Massachusetts Failure
In 1970, Massachusetts became the first state to enact a compulsory no-
fault law. The principal promise was a 15 per cent mandatory rate reduction
on total premium, at that time the highest in the nation. Following its enact-
ment, the law's mandatory rate reduction on all but the bodily injury portion of
the premium was successfully challenged by the industry on constitutional
grounds,7" with the net result that the Massachusetts motorist was left with "no-
fault" insurance but a rate reduction on only a small portion of the premium.
For the first nine months under the new no-fault system, the total payout
by the entire insurance industry was only $2,296,802, compared to $11,308,925
for the first nine months of 1970, the last year of the fault system. After suc-
cessive efforts by John Ryan, the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner, a 27.4
per cent bodily injury (BI) premium reduction was accomplished. This, plus
73 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. See also Testimony of Professor Norman Dorsen Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 354, February 7, 1974.
74 Dean Griswold in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 30,
1974 suggested mandamus against State legislatures as a means of compelling them to enact such
laws as would be necessary. He refrained, however, from taking a position on the wisdom of
such action.
75 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Comm'r. of Ins., 358 Mass. 272, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970).
76 Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
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the mandatory 15 per cent reduction on BI coverage, has resulted in a cost reduc-
tion in bodily injury coverage, but any erroneous notions which the public may
harbor about the "success" of the Massachusetts experiment are quickly dis-
pelled by an examination of the following table,7 which sets forth the cost of
total automobile insurance coverage for the City of Boston for the year 1970, the
last year under the fault system, and each succeeding year to date.
1970 1972
(Tort System) (No-Fault)
Compulsory Bodily Injury $117 $ 74
10/20 Coverage 26 22
Property Damage 49 21
Medical Payments 15 9
Uninsured Motorists 2 2
Comprehensive 126 133
Collision ($100 deductible) 161 294
Total -------------------------------- $496 $555
It is clearly evident that the bodily injury portion of the premium has, indeed,
been reduced, but the overall cost of insuring a car in Massachusetts is about
the same today as it was in 1970. The only difference is that now the insurance
industry is retaining more of the premium dollar, while less is being paid to the
victims.
Dr. Calvin H. Brainard, Professor of Finance and Insurance at the Univer-
sity of Rhode Island, recently noted that if the Commissioner had not succeeded
in reducing the bodily injury premium in Massachusetts through the forceful
measures he took, the industry would have increased their gross margin of profits
two-and-one-half times.78 It is small wonder that the insurance industry is en-
amored by the no-fault concept.
Policy Yea 79  Premiums Losses Gross Margin Loss Ratios
1971 $111.2 $48.9 $62.3 44%
1970 $130.6 $99.2 $31.4 76%
1969 $126.0 $97.1 $28.9 77%
1968 $121.8 $93.9 $27.9 77%
Even more interesting, Professor Brainard pointed out that while 38,000 vic-
tims who would not have been eligible for tort recovery were paid some econom-
ical loss benefits in 1971, 88,000 tort eligible victims did not present claims
that year." This may be due in part to fear of cancellation by their insurer. At
77 Schwartz, Faulty-No-Fault: Let the Consumer Beware, 22 CATHOLIC U.L. Rv. 746, 767
(1973).
78 Brainard, The Impact of No-Fault on Underwriting Results of Massachusetts Insurers,
44 Miss. L.J. 174 (1973).
79 Id. at 176. Earned premiums incurred and developed losses including allocated claim
expense, and gross margins (before expenses) are in millions of dollars.
80 Id. at 178-79.
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any rate, it seems that under no-fault we would have to adjust to a new sense of
mores. The negligent victims would receive compensation, while the innocent
victims would not.
IX. Principal Arguments of No-Faulters
The excuses for these drastic encroachments on the individual's basic right
to recover the full measure of his loss have alternatively been given as delay in
settlement of claims, difficulty in establishing fault, crowded court dockets, and
high insurance rates. Other arguments frequently encountered are that the
seriously injured victim is undercompensated, and that legal fees consume a
major portion of the premium dollar under the tort system. The truth of the
matter is that the insurance industry, having experienced unexpectedly high
profits from its Massachusetts no-fault venture, has come to realize that no-
fault is infinitely more profitable and less difficult to administer. Understand-
ably, the industry likes it. Equally significant, improved highway design and
the adoption of federal safety standards on late model vehicles have combined
to reduce the frequency and severity of injury, with a resulting decrease in bodily
injury rates in most "fault" states."' No-fault insurance promises to provide a
good replacement market for the cash flow which the automobile casualty in-
surance companies expect to lose from the trend toward lower bodily injury
premiums."
X. Criticisms of the Current System
A. Delay in Settlement of Claims
The contention that there is delay in settlement of tort claims also does not
withstand close scrutiny. According to insurance industry studies, 80 per cent
of all bodily injury claims are settled within six months," while 90 per cent are
settled within a year." There is no delay in payment of claims for medical and
wage loss to automobile accident victims who are covered by such insurance
(70-80 per cent of auto insurees carry such coverage).5 Moreover, some medical
and wage loss is all that about 97 per cent of automobile accident victims would
receive under the average no-fault scheme anyway; so no logical reason exists
for abolishing the victim's tort rights.
B. Difficulty in Determining Fault
According to insurance industry studies," fault can easily be determined in
90 per cent of all automobile accident cases from a simple reading of the police
report. Police reports would still be necessary under a "no-fault" system. If
more persons would be eligible for benefits under no-fault as contended, a good
81 Spangenberg, No-Fault, Fact, Fiction and Fallacy, 44 Miss. L. J. 15 (1973).
82 Id. at 17-18.
83 DOT, AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAiMS, supra note 12 at 84.
84 NAT'L. ASS'N. OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS, supra note 63.
85 Record, testimony of Charles Hewitt [Insurance Actuary for Allstate Insurance Co.],
Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E. 2d 474 (1972).
86 NAT'L ASSN. OF INDEPENDENT INSURERS, supra note 63.
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argument can be made that investigation costs under no-fault should be more.
Every accident would not only have to be investigated for liability, but the
medical and employment history of the greater number of claimants would have
to be checked as well.
C. Court Congestion
Court congestion exists only in a few metropolitan areas."" In the vast
majority of states it is virtually non-existent. For example, a case can be tried
in Iowa within 5.2 months after the case is ready for trial;"8 in New Hampshire,
3 months;89 Kansas, 7 months;9" and in Miami, Florida, 8/2 months. 1 In
Tennessee, South Dakota, Oklahoma and North Dakota, a case can be reached
for trial between 5 and 6 months from the time the answer is filed;92 reaching
the same requires point less than 9 months in Oregon.93 In most jurisdictions,
there is no noticeable delay whatsoever. Even Chicago, which had long been
regarded as one of the worst cities in the country for court congestion, is prac-
tically current."' From all present indications, cases filed in 1971 will have been
called for trial by September, 1973." Whatever delay might exist in the few
jurisdictions having crowded dockets concerns claims for general damages, i.e.,
disability and pain and suffering (which the proponents would abolish anyway),
not payment of medical and wage loss. And to say that the way to cure this
"delay" is by abolishing the right of recovery altogether, as the no-faulters do, is
pure mad-hatter logic.
D. High Cost of Insurance
This argument is equally misleading. According to the DOT, the total
premium actually paid for combined bodily injury and property damage liability
insurance in 1968 on private passenger cars was surprisingly low. 6
The National Average cost for the combined coverage was $88.20.17 This
broke down to $55.40 for bodily injury and $32.80 for property damage. On
the average, 30 per cent of the combined premium cost is for property damage.
E. The Seriously Injured Victim
One of the most strident arguments of the no-faulters is that under the
87 1969 DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RESPONSIBLE REFORM, A PROGRA!M TO IM-
PROVE THE LIABILIrY SYSTEMS 14 (No. 8, 1970).






94 119 CHL L. BULL., 115 (1973).
95 Id.
96 See also DOT AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS, supra note 12.
97 See also DOT, AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS, supra note 12. The average
premium cost for Illinois outside of Cook County was $51.00 in 1970. The last cost of B/I
coverage is further put in proper focus when we consider that 30 per cent of B/I P/D is for
property damage, so 25/50 liability policy in Illinois only costs $33.00.
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present system the seriously injured are undercompensated while the less seriously
injured victims are overcompensated. According to DOT study based on a
sample of 1,376 cases,9 the fatal and nonfatal "serious injury" cases number
513,098 annually (out of a total of four to five million). The total economic loss
of this class is estimated at $5,126,595 per year. This is an average loss of
$9,991 per victim.99
The DOT found that this class recovered a net amount of only 16 per cent
of its loss from the tort system, and an additional 33 per cent from other systems
for a total recovery of 49 per cent.' However, a closer study of the sample
data reveals that the average recovery of the entire class is relatively low due to
the extremely high loss sustained by a very small number of catastrophically in-
jured claimants (less than one per cent). As a matter of fact, all victims who
have an economic loss of $10,000 or less to the date of settlement recover on the
average their total loss from the multiple reparation systems in force. Victims who
sustain a loss in excess of $10,000, but less than $25,000, recover 92 percent of
their total loss from the combined systems.'' The sub-class of catastrophe cases
whose economic loss averages in excess of $25,000 (45,153 persons annually)
has been computed at $76,341. The total economic loss, including future loss
of this one per cent of the total number of victims, has been established at $3,447
billion.'-
Since automobile casualty insurers pay out approximately 60 per cent of
the premium dollar in benefits, $5,463 billion in net annual premium would be
needed to satisfy the claims of the one per cent (45,153) whose losses exceed
$25,000. °' The total standard limit premium at 1967 loss levels, adjusted up-
ward to reflect more additional compulsory premium payers, would generate
only $3.5 billion.'" Thus, it would require a 56 per cent increase in standard
bodily injury premium just to compensate this one per cent of the victims---even
if no payment whatever were made for the economic loss of the remaining 99
per cent. No one seems to be willing to pay this price.
By the same token, unless we are willing to double or triple premiums (or
abolish the private insurance industry), there is no justification to abolish tort
rights of 95 per cent or more of automobile accident victims. Most no-fault
systems thus far proposed would pay only the smaller losses which are presently
98 The DOT, in its automobile accident compensation study, published data on seriously
injured victims entitled ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE AccmENT INJURIES.
See also Spangenberg, Exposing a Half-truth, TRIAL MAGAZINE (Nov.-Dec. 1972).
99 TRIAL LAWYERS' STATEMENT, supra note 50 at 26.
100 Id. at 27.
101 Id. at 28.
102 Id. at 277.
103 All systems show deficiencies when the losses exceed $25,000. The subclass of ca-
tastrophe cases is said to number 45,153 persons annually, or 8.8 per cent of the whole class of
fatal/serious cases. Note, however, that the total number of all injury victims annually, se-
rious and non-serious as defined, is variously estimated between 4 million and 5.5 million.
The number adopted by the Department of Transportation in its final report was 4.2 million.
DOT, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LossEs. The small number of catastrophe cases, estimated at
8.8 per cent of the class of "serious injured or fatality victims" is only 1.07 per cent of the
entire group of all accident victims. The small subclass of fatally/seriously injured persons who
recover inadequately under the tort systems also recover inadequately from all the other systems
such as life insurance, health and accident insurance, social security, medical pay auto insurance,
sick leave, and wage continuation plans.
104 TRIAL LAWYERS' STATEMENT, supra note 50, at 31.
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being fully compensated by the combined reparations systems. The seriously
injured would gain little. Theoretically they would retain the right to recover
in full if innocent. However, the limits for bodily injury insurance (which pays for
pain and suffering and disability, etc., under the tort system) under most pro-
posed plans would remain inordinately low-between $10,000 and $25,000 per
victim. It is obvious, therefore, that the "unlimited" right of recovery in tort
for the seriously injured victim would be illusory.
F. Lawyer Fees
Perhaps the most reckless argument of the no-fault proponents is that only
44 cents of each premium dollar is paid in benefits1 5 This contention is based
on the erroneous assumption that every claimant retains a lawyer and that 22
cents of each premium dollar is paid to attorneys. On a national average, less
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105 R. Keeton, Automobile Insurance Reform Tailored to the Need 1-8, March 11, 1969
(statement prepared for the Joint Comm. on Ins., Mass.). See also Spangenberg, supra note
81, at 32.
106 DOT, ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION By STATE (1972).
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There would be even less lawyer involvement if the insurance industry
would pay claims promptly and fairly. Be that as it may, the automobile casualty
insurers pay out an average of 60 to 62 cents out of each premium dollar in
benefits."' This is a much better performance record than that of most other
private insurers. By contrast, non-group accident and health carriers pay only
45 cents in benefits out of each premium dollar. At any rate, legal fees of
claimants' attorneys average only 6 to 7 per cent of the premium dollar, not 22
per cent. Moreover, the DOT found that, on the average, claimants who retained
attorneys fared much better than their counterparts."" This does not mean, of
course, that all claimants who did not retain attorneys fared poorly. But we may
reasonably surmise that the mere ability of the citizen to retain a lawyer in-
fluenced many a claim adjustor to make a fair offer in settlement.
The other half of the argument is that the lawyers' stake in the tort system
is a billion dollars per year. Sometimes the amount of lawyers' fees has been
ballooned to between one-and-a-half and two billion dollars. The latter figure
would account for approximately half of the total bodily injury premium collected
in 1969.
The DOT estimate for claimants' attorneys' fees was $794,000.1'9 But even
this figure is subject to question. The DOT estimates were arrived at by includ-
ing four Northeastern states which experienced a high lawyer retention rate.
The sample was further weighted in favor of large fees because it comprised a
great number of cases actually tried to verdict. This obviously would result in
greater aggregate fees. Since most of the fees recovered involve seriously injured
cases, it is doubtful if the abolition of the tort rights of 95 per cent or more of the
automobile accident victims would save more than a third of the total fees paid
to claimants' attorneys. Even at today's inflated prices, the total savings would
be less than a third of a billion dollars per year. This is a far cry from the bil-
lion, billion-and-a-half, or two billion dollars per year figures manufactured by
the well-oiled no-fault propaganda machine.
XI. Legitimate Reforms
A. Needed Reform in the Insurance System
We do not pretend that the present insurance system is perfect. There is
much room for improvement. Laws prohibiting the arbitrary cancellation of
insurance policies and the arbitrary refusal to renew policies must be enacted; the
indefensible practice of some insurance carriers to reject applicants for auto-
mobile insurance not on their driving record but because of race, or color, or the
area wherein they live, must be eliminated. The unethical practice of some in-
107 Spangenberg, supra note 81, at 26. If present premiums are divided 40 per cent to the
insurer and 60 per cent to innocent claimants, then at the same level of premiums under no-
fault, only 60 cents of the premium dollar will still be available to pay both the innocent and
guilty drivers, and the single-car accident drivers who do not now participate in the system at
all.
108 TRIAL LAWYERS' STATEMENT, supra note 50, at 97.
109 Id.
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surers in rejecting applicants, thus forcing them into an assigned risk plan at
higher rates, must be stopped. Many of the abuses enumerated above, as well as
some of the bad claims practices which have incurred public wrath, have
diminished thanks to the threat of federal regulation of the insurance industry.
But there is still room for improvement.
B. Needed Reform in Tort System
We also do not pretend that the tort system is perfect. Many states still
cling to archaic guest statutes which deny an injured victim any recovery unless
the driver can be proven guilty of wilful and wanton conduct. Some states still
retain governmental immunity which shields them, their municipalities, and other
political subdivisions from liability for their negligent or wrongful acts. Other
states still maintain a death limit. In addition, liability insurance coverage is often
too low; most states still require the minimum 10/20 coverage, i.e., $10,000
maximum coverage for any one person injured or killed and $20,000 for the
aggregate loss of all persons killed or injured in any one accident. And, human
nature being what it is, there admittedly is abuse under the present system by a
small minority of claimants who would exaggerate their injury or economic loss.
This human frailty, however, will not be changed by converting to a no-fault
system. In any event, as Chief Justice Tauro reasoned in his special concurring
opinion in Pinnick v. Cleary, "no plan ... should resort to burning down the
barn to get rid of the mice."'1 10
XII. Conclusion
No-fault insurance has been around for 110 years. It is simply first party
medical and wage loss coverage. Most people have multiple sources of medical
wage loss recovery, in addition to the automobile no-fault benefits available to
them. The automobile casualty company's version of no-fault would abolish or
severely restrict the victim's right to recover general damages, ie., for disability
and suffering, and limit the victim to recovery of his medical and some wage
loss. Much of the confusion connected with no-fault stems from the "no-fault"
label. "Fault" is and always will be present. It is only responsibility for fault
that would be abolished by the insurance industry's proposals. This is the fault
with no-fault.
A true consumer no-fault plan can furnish both "butter and guns.""'  The
Delaware Plan, which has been in force for almost two years, has reduced claims
by more than 70 per cent." 2 Lawyer representation has been reduced to the
110 271 N.E. 2d 609, 613 (1971).
111 Schwartz, supra note 66.
112 The "Delaware Motorists Protection Act" became effective January 1, 1972. Under
this article no threshold was established-the act simply providing that: (1) Automobile in-
surance coverage is compulsory for all automobiles registered in the state; (2) all companies
will add the no-fault coverage to existing policies at no inconvenience to the policyholder; (3)
there will be direct payment of benefits for medical and hospital costs, loss of wages, and
expenses for services to the insured by his own company, regardless of fault; (4) the insured
will continue to have the liability coverage that he needs; (5) insurance companies have the
responsibility of explaining to their policyholders all changes in coverage.
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same extent. In Delaware, medical and wage loss is paid to the victim regardless
of fault, but there is no abridgement of the victim's rights to general damages.
The Delaware experience has indeed proven that, where the victim has received
his medical and wage loss, the incentive to make further claim is extinguished
in all but the most serious cases. This has been accomplished merely by pre-
cluding the injured victim from recovering medical and wage loss which he
had previously received from his own auto insurance carrier. The Delaware
Plan, or some variation of it, is all that is needed to reform the automobile in-
surance system, at least from the standpoint of the consumer.
